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Abstract
We investigated the nature of the oil price hike to the Korean economy in
recent years. We found that the recent run-up in the oil price was induced
by an increase in oil demand, in contrast to the previous increases that
originated mostly due to supply disruptions. We also studied how monetary
responses to oil price shocks aﬀect economic stabilities. We found that an
accommodative policy yields more stable outcomes.
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The world oil price reached a recorded high level in the summer of 2008 following
its ascent from 2002. The increase in oil price is noticeable following a long
stable period of oil price movements after the second world oil crisis of 1979-1980.
Figure 1 shows the Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price movements and
the (shaded) recessions of the Korean economy since 1970. As we glance over
the ﬁgure, we ﬁnd the several of the Korean economic recessions coincide with
episodes of world oil price hikes, particularly for the periods of 1973-1974 and
1979-1980.
Figure 1: Oil Price & Korean Economic Recessions










The recent increase in the world oil price did not induce much attention con-
cerning the possibility of causing an economic recession. This is in contrast to
previous episodes of the world oil price hikes, that many studies attributed as
causes of economic recessions. The recent oil price hike began to stabilize after
autumn 2008. However, it still raises questions concerning the relationship be-
tween world oil price hikes and macroeconomy; such as why the recent oil price
hike did not cause a serious economic recession as previously. The macroeconomic
i m p a c t so rn a t u r eo ft h eo i lp r i c eh i k em i g h th a v ec h a n g e df r o mt h ep a s t .
Generally, an increase in oil price will aﬀect economic growth adversely both
through consumption and production channels. An increase in oil price will raise
the consumers’ cost of living and reduce overall consumption. In addition, it will
add more uncertainties to consumers’ future economic outlooks and negatively
aﬀect the economy, as consumers will save more and spend less out of a precau-
tionary motive facing the increased uncertainties. Hamilton (2005) stressed an
indirect eﬀect due to changes in the compositions of consumption expenditure.
That is, changes in the compositions disturb sectoral allocations of resources and
result in cutbacks in consumption, as well as increases in unemployment due to
frictions in labor and capital markets. An increase in oil price will also aﬀecteconomic growth adversely through production channels. An increase in oil price
will raise production costs and increase uncertainties surrounding businesses and
thus it will reduce productions.
In the past, large oil price hikes occurred following supply contractions due to
geopolitical conﬂicts and uncertainties tied to oil-exporting countries. Hamilton
(1996) showed that increases in oil prices preceded most U.S. recessions and that
they were the main causes of the recessions. Using NYMEX crude oil futures data,
Guo and Kliesen (2005) found that oil price volatilities had signiﬁcant adverse
eﬀects on investment, consumption, and the unemployment rate.
The recent rise in oil price, however, can be viewed from a somewhat diﬀerent
perspective. In terms of the world oil market, oil demand increased substantially
recently. For instances, China and India, new world economic powerhouses, have
become huge consumers of crude oil. Other Asian economies have also increased
their demands for crude oil as they recover from the ﬁnancial crises of the late
1990s. In addition, developed countries also continued to grow during the period,
supported by somewhat low interest rates. The recent hike in oil price thus might
be viewed as endogenous movements along with the developments of strong oil
market demands (or world economy), rather than exogenous movements stemming
from supply side contractions as in the past.1
In terms of monetary policy, the recent oil price hike also reignites debates
as to on which inﬂation measure the central bank should focus.2 Oil price hike
results in divergence between headline inﬂation and core inﬂation which excludes
energy and food inﬂation from headline inﬂation. The oil price increase may pass
through to the price of non-energy goods and services and lead to a dissociation
between the headline and core inﬂation. The possible widening gap between two
measures of inﬂation again raises the questions concerning the correct choice of
inﬂation measure for conducting monetary policy.
In this paper, we ﬁrst analyze the nature of oil price hikes and their impacts
on the Korean economy. We examine in detail whether the recent oil price hike is
s i m i l a rt oo rd i ﬀerent from previous ones in terms of its origination. We further
examine the impacts of the recent oil price hike on the Korean economy and
compare them to previous experiences. We ﬁnd the recent oil price hike originates
endogenously from the demand side of world oil market, rather than exogenously
from the supply side. The macroeconomic impact of the oil price hike is somewhat
weakened compared to the previous oil price hikes due to possible changes in
macroeconomic structure.
1Kilian (2008) provide evidence that unanticipated crude oil supply shocks are far less im-
portant than shocks from the demand for crude oil.
2Countries diﬀer in their choice of an inﬂation measure for monetary policy. For example,
the Bank of England and the Bank of Korea chooses headline inﬂation as their policy target,
while the U.S. Federal Reserve puts more emphasis on core inﬂation.We also discuss which inﬂation target would be more appropriate for the cen-
tral bank to stabilize the economy. For this purpose, we built a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to examine the issue in a structural model.
The model incorporates a Taylor type monetary policy rule and monetary policy
responds diﬀerentially to oil and non-oil prices, which correspond to non-core and
core measures of inﬂation.
Previous literature generally tends to side with core inﬂation targeting rather
than headline inﬂation targeting. Goodfriend and King (1997) suggest that mon-
etary policy needs to focus on the sticky component of prices, rather than overall
prices, implying core inﬂation to be the major target for conducting monetary
policy. Aoki (2001) constructs a two sector model, one with sticky price and the
other with ﬂexible price and shows complete stabilization of sticky price inﬂation
is optimal in the model. Blinder and Reis (2005) provide evidences that core
inﬂation predicts future headline inﬂation better than headline inﬂation itself.3
Bodenstein et al. (2008) show core inﬂation targeting in response to oil price
shocks stabilize the economy better than headline inﬂation targeting in a DSGE
model.
Conversely, Harris et al. (2009) criticize the policy recommendations from the
above standard new Keynesian models in that these models assume the complete
anchoring of inﬂation expectations. They show that longer-term consumer expec-
tations on inﬂation respond to oil price shocks and suggest that the Fed should
have put more weight on headline inﬂation. Hamilton (2008) shows that oil price
shocks cannot be treated as merely transitory discussing statistical characteristics
of oil price shocks from historical data and suggests that the central bank needs
to pay more attention to the development of headline inﬂation including energy
and food prices.
We ﬁnd in an estimated DSGE model of the Korean economy that energy or
oil price is relatively ﬂexible compared to non-oil price and wage but not com-
pletely ﬂexible and monetary policy would stabilize the economy better when it
accommodates oil price inﬂation rather than ﬁght against it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
basic ﬁndings from data. In section 3, we construct a ﬁve-variable structural VAR
model and analyze the relationship between oil price and the Korean economy. In
section 4, we present a DSGE model with oil sector and discuss monetary policy
implications. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
3Cogley (2002) and Rich and Steindel (2007) also found the signiﬁcant reversion of headline
inﬂation to core inﬂation.Table 1: Summary Statistics
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
4log WTI 1.45 12.08 3.08 15.64
4log CPI 2.39 1.96 0.76 0.44
4log CORE 2.06 1.75 0.70 0.31
4log RGDP 1.87 1.29 1.09 1.43
INTR 3.15 0.58 1.05 0.17
INTR-4log CPI 1.67 0.70 0.28 0.42
Note: Measures in Quarterly growth.
Log diﬀerence from the previous quarter times 100.
2D a t a
In this section, we examine the properties of quarterly Korean data as well as
world oil price; real GDP, CPI, (real and nominal) interest rates together with
world oil price (the WTI) as a preliminary step before formal analyses. We divide
the data set into two sub-periods, namely before and after the Korean currency
crisis in 1998-1999 that is believed to have caused a structural break in the Korean
economy.4 The pre-crisis sample period is 1987:I-1997:IV and post-crisis sample
period is 2000:I-2009:I. The division is also helpful to compare the eﬀects of the
recent oil price hike from the previous ones before the 1990s.
We ﬁrst show the means and standard deviations of the log-diﬀerence data
during the two sub-periods in Table 1. As we can see from the table, the standard
deviations of the WTI and the real GDP log diﬀerence during the post-crisis period
are somewhat higher than for the pre-crisis period. The standard deviations of
headline and core CPI inﬂations and real interest rate during the post-crisis period
a r es u b s t a n t i a l l yl o w e rt h a nt h ep r e - c r i s i sp e r i o d .W ea l s or e p o r tu n i tr o o tt e s t s
on the variables in Table 2. Interestingly, we ﬁnd CPI level data does not contain
the unit root process and seems to be stationary during the post-crisis period from
the tests, reﬂecting recent low inﬂation.
As a way to observe the dynamic impacts of oil price hikes on the macroecon-
omy, we provide the cumulative real GDP growth and CPI inﬂation during the
t w ow o r l do i lc r i s e sa n dt h er e c e n to i lp r ice hike in Figure2. The series in Figure2
have 4 years duration each and the datings follow Blanchard and Gali (2007).5
4Much evidence supports the view that the Korean economy has experienced important and
long-term changes during the periods. See Kim and Kang (2004) amongst others.
5Blanchard and Gali (2007) identify four episodes of oil price shocks when the cumulative
changes in (log) oil price are above 50 percent. We discard the 3rd episode (1999:I-2000.IV) as
the period is close to the 4th period (2002.I-2005.III).Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
PP test ADF test KPSS test PP test ADF test KPSS test
ρ t-val ρ t-val LM-stat ρ t-val ρ t-val LM-stat
WTI -0.03 -1.63 -0.04 -1.56 0.24 -0.20 -1.85 -0.47 -3.15 0.13
CPI -0.02 -1.92 -0.01 -1.89 0.24 -0.20 -2.31 -0.29 -2.06 0.08
CORE -0.01 -1.78 -0.03 -2.46 0.11 -0.01 -1.53 -0.24 -3.07 0.08
RGDP 0.00 -0.15 -0.00 -0.41 0.31 -0.15 -1.73 -0.65 -2.87 0.09
INTR -0.21 -2.09 -0.25 -2.18 0.15 -0.07 -1.74 -0.17 -2.03 0.14
4log WTI -0.86 -9.75 -0.82 -5.76 0.08 -0.54 -3.52 -0.68 -2.30 0.09
4log CPI -0.45 -6.03 -0.37 -4.14 0.11 -0.96 -5.71 -0.87 -2.84 0.06
4log CORE -0.33 -4.79 -0.18 -2.24 0.12 -0.47 -3.54 -0.47 -2.66 0.10
4log RGDP -0.83 -8.67 -0.75 -5.15 0.07 -0.93 -5.65 -1.03 -2.96 0.09
INTR- 4log CPI -0.75 -5.28 -0.57 -2.59 0.11 -1.04 -6.14 -0.75 -2.49 0.11
Note: Asymptotic critical values for LM statistics are 0.216, 0.146, and 0.199 at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively





























T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h eﬁgure depicts the cumulative real GDP growth and
we observe the negative eﬀects on real GDP growth possibly induced by the oil
price hike are most pronounced during the second world oil crisis, 1979:I-1983.I.
The real GDP growth shrank for almost two years before bouncing back to its
trend growth. During the recent oil price hike, the real GDP growth seems to
be little aﬀected for at least one year after the oil price hike and then it declined
slightly later, but the contraction was not much pronounced.
The right hand side of the ﬁgure illustrates the cumulative CPI inﬂation for
the periods. The cumulative CPI inﬂation for the ﬁrst and second oil crises
look similar and the CPI inﬂation increased about 70% during both periods.
H o w e v e r ,t h ec u m u l a t i v eC P Ii n ﬂation during the recent oil price hike shows
diﬀerent dynamics from the previous periods and the CPI inﬂa t i o nh a sr i s e na b o u t
12% over four years, i.e. 3% increase per annum. We may possibly conjecturethat the macroeconomic eﬀects of an oil price hike on inﬂation have diminished
during the recent oil price hike.
As a simple way to compare the pre- and post-crisis macroeconomic responses
to oil price hikes, we present nonparametric estimation results from regressing real
GDP and CPI inﬂation on oil price in Figure 3.6 T h el e f th a n ds i d ep a n e lo ft h e
ﬁgure shows pre-crisis results and right panel shows post-crisis results. During the
pre-crisis period, real GDP growth and oil price are negatively related and CPI
inﬂation and oil price are not clearly related. During the post-crisis period, real
GDP growth is almost ﬂat to oil price changes and real GDP and oil price are not
clearly related in contrast to the pre-crisis sample. In addition, CPI inﬂation and
o i lp r i c e sa r en o ta sc l e a r l yr e l a t e da sb e f o r e .
Figure 3: Nonparametric GDP and Inflation Responses to Oil
Price Hikes












































































I ns u m m a r y ,t h ed a t ai n d i c a t et h a tt h em a c r o e c o n o m i cr e s p o n s e st oo i lp r i c e
hikes may have changed in such a way that the Korean economy accommodates
them better recently following the Korean currency crisis from our simple prelim-
inary examinations.
6In estimation, we use a Gaussian kernel regression with optimal bandwidth suggested by
Bowman and Azzalini (1997).3D y n a m i c E ﬀects of Oil Price Hikes
3.1 A Structural VAR Model
In this section, we use a ﬁve-variable VAR model as our workhorse to quantify
the responses of real GDP and inﬂation to oil price hikes. The results will be used
to detect how the macroeconomic transmission mechanism of oil price hikes has
changed before and after the Korean currency crisis.
We choose the log diﬀerence of oil price, export, real GDP, CPI price index and
real interest rate as our ﬁve variables for the VAR analysis. Corresponding to the
ﬁve variables, we introduce ﬁve structural shocks that aﬀect the Korean economy:
oil price shock, export shock, local aggregate supply shock, local aggregate de-
mand shock and monetary policy shock. Since, these structural shocks cannot be
observed directly, we need to employ identifying restrictions to disentangle them.
Our identiﬁcation assumptions are based on both long-run and short-run restric-
tions. These will be discussed shortly. Let ∆zt =[ ∆Po,t,∆Xt,∆Yt,∆Pt,i−∆Pt]0
denotes the vector of the ﬁve variables; the log diﬀerence of oil price, export,
real GDP, price index and real interest rate. We assume that ∆zt is a covariance
stationary vector process suggested by the statistics in Table 2. Each element of
∆zt is demeaned, hence it has a zero mean. The structural VAR with p lags can
be expressed with the following representation
A0∆zt = A1∆zt−1 + A2∆zt−2 + ···+ Ap∆zt−p + ωt (1)
where A0 is 5 × 5 matrix restricting contemporaneous relations of the included





t ]0 is a 5 × 1 column vector consisting of
oil price shock (OS), export shock (ES), local aggregate supply shock (LS), and
local aggregate demand shock (LD) and monetary policy shock (MP) respectively
and E [ωt]=0and E [ωtω0
t]=I5×5. Alternatively, the structural VAR can be
expressed as the following
∆zt = B1∆zt−1 + B2∆zt−2 + ···+ Bp∆zt−p + Cωt = B(L)∆zt + Cωt (2)
where Bj = A
−1
0 Aj , C = A
−1
0 and B(L)=B1L + B2L2 + ···+ BpLP and L is
lag operator. If zt is a stationary process, the VAR system can be rewritten as
a VMA (Vector Moving Average) system according to the Wold representation
theorem:
∆zt = D(L)ωt (3)
where D(L)=( I − B(L))−1 and D(L) is invertible. Once we have D(L),w ec a n
recover expressions for the levels of the diﬀerent variables in terms of current and
lagged values of the structural disturbances by a straightforward transformation.The reduced-form autoregressive representation of the VAR is given by
∆zt = F(L)∆zt + ut (4)
where E [ut]=0and E [utu0
t]=Ω. Then, the reduced-form Wold moving average
representation of ∆zt can be expressed as
∆zt = G(L)ut (5)
where G(L)=( I − F(L))−1 and G(L) is invertible and ut is the vector of in-
novations in the elements of ∆zt. Comparing Eq.(2) and Eq.(4), the following
condition holds
ut = Cωt (6)
for some 5 × 5 full rank matrix C. Eq.(3), Eq.(5) and Eq.(6) imply that
D(L)=G(L)C (7)
Pre-multiplying both sides of Eq.(4) by C−1,w ec a no b t a i nt h es t r u c t u r a lr e p r e -
sentation of ∆zt and the structural disturbance vector ωt. The structural VAR
can be identiﬁe dt ot h ee x t e n tt h a tw ei n t r o d u c es u ﬃcient restrictions to deter-
mine 25 elements of matrix C.G i v e nC,w ec a nr e c o v e rD(L) by post-multiplying
G(L) in Eq.(7).
As the reduced-form variance-covariance matrix has ﬁfteen elements, we need
ten more restrictions to just-identify the system. For this purpose, we introduce
three long-run neutrality restrictions and seven short-run restrictions. Concerning
the long-run restrictions, we assume that the growth in the oil price, expressed in
WTI, is not aﬀected by the local shocks, implying D1,3(1) = D1,4(1) = D1,5(1) = 0.
The short-run restrictions are composed of two groups: one limits the con-
temporaneous eﬀects of shocks; the other limits the contemporaneous eﬀects of
endogenous variables. Simply put, we introduce the short-run restrictions for both
the matrix C and A0. Concerning the restrictions on the matrix C, we assume no
contemporaneous eﬀects of local shocks on oil price. These imply the following




We ﬁnally impose linear restrictions on the relationships between the contempora-
neous variables, namely restrictions on A0: (1) contemporaneous oil price does not
aﬀect export, (2) contemporaneous interest rate does not aﬀect real GDP, (3) con-temporaneous oil price does not aﬀect real interest rate, and (4) contemporaneous







0 = C, these restrictions can be map into 4 non-linear constraints on
the elements of C.
3.2 Empirical Results
Figure 4 displays the cumulative impulse-response functions based on VAR es-
timates from the pre-crisis sample period. Each column in the ﬁgure represents
impulse-response functions to one standard deviation of a structural shock.
In the ﬁrst column, we show the impulse-response functions to an oil price
shock. The shock decreases both export and real GDP immediately. The decrease
in export is due to the contraction of the world economy after a hike in oil price.
Similarly, the domestic real GDP decreases due to contractionary eﬀects after the
oil shock. The positive standard deviation shock decreases real GDP permanently
by 0.5%. CPI decreases initially but climbs steadily up after the shock, resulting
in 0.2% increase twenty quarters after the shock. Real interest rate decreases due
to the increased inﬂation after the shock.
The second column represents the impulse-response functions to an export
shock. A positive foreign export shock raises export and real GDP permanently
by 2.1% and 0.4% each. The shock has limited eﬀects on oil price. CPI increases
for seven quarters after the shock and then decreases slowly. Real interest rate
decreases due to the increase in inﬂation but slowly moves up, resulting in a long
run rise of 0.4%.
The third column represents the impulse-response functions to a local AS
shock. The local AS shock increases domestic output and decreases CPI as a
textbook AD-AS analysis predicts. The initial deﬂationary impact raises the real
interest rate. Export decreases somewhat after the shock. This is somewhat non-
standard. We may interpret this as a switch from export to domestic absorption,
given unchanged demand from abroad and increased domestic demand (output)
after the shock.
The fourth column shows the impulse-response functions to a local AD shock.
In addition, as predicted by a standard AD-AS analysis, real GDP and CPI move
up together in the same direction. The real interest rate goes down due to the
increase in inﬂation. Export decreases somewhat given unchanged demand fromabroad and increased domestic demand after the shock.
Finally, the ﬁfth column provides the impulse-response functions to a monetary
policy shock. The monetary policy shock lowers real GDP and CPI as predicted.
Contractionary eﬀects of the shock reduce domestic demand and export increases
accordingly. Real interest rate rises after the deﬂationary eﬀect of the shock.
We next report the results from the post-crisis sample period in Figure 5. As
we discussed in the introduction, the purpose of the VAR analyses is to detect
the nature of the oil shock that may originate from the supply or demand sides of
the oil market. Thus, we focus on the impulse-response functions to an oil price
shock.
What stands out from the post crisis sample is the impulse-response function
of export to an oil price shock and export increases after the shock in contrast
to the pre-crisis sample. We interpret this as oil shock in the post-crisis sample
originating from the demand side of the oil market and the demand side factor
that drives the oil price up is a common factor that increases export. In the pre-
crisis sample analysis, the export response to an oil price shock is negative and we
interpret this as an oil price shock originating from the supply side of oil market
and it reduces export due to its contractionary eﬀects on the world economy. Real
GDP shows similar movements in response to the oil price shock.
O n em i g h tt h i n kt h a tt h ed i ﬀerent responses of real GDP and export to an
oil price shock before and after the crisis are stemming from changed exchange
rate regimes between the pre- and post-crisis period. If we review the history of
the Korean foreign exchange system brieﬂy, Korea introduced a multi-currency
basket system in 1980 and the government tightly controlled foreign exchange
rates until a market average exchange rate system was introduced in 1991. Since
the adoption of the system, market forces played an increasingly important role in
the determination of foreign exchange rates. Daily ﬂuctuations in exchange rates
were limited strictly in this system, however. After the outbreak of the crisis,
Korea adopted a free ﬂoating exchange rate system and foreign exchange rates
are freely determined by market forces. From this perspective, one may conjecture
that an increase in oil price raises the exchange rate and spurs exports after the
crisis, which would have been weak before the crisis when exchange rates were
strictly controlled by the government.
We ﬁnd this argument unconvincing. We regress oil price on exchange rates
and report the results in Table 3. We ﬁnd the regression coeﬃcients are negatively
(not positively) signiﬁcant in the post-crisis sample with their values ranging from
-0.171 to -0.226; whereas those of the pre-crisis are distributed between -0.004 to
0.008, moreover statistically insigniﬁcant.Figure 4: Impulse Responses: Based on Pre-Crisis Estimates
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INTR to MP shockTable 3: Regression Estimates
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
KRW/USD REER KRW/USD REER
WTI -0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.226 -0.241 -0.171 -0.197
[-0.09] [-0.17] [0.20] [0.22] [-5.11] [-4.84] [-3.82] [-3.98]
WTI(-1) 0.014 -0.008 0.035 0.062
[0.56] [-0.21] [0.67] [1.20]
Const. 4.576 4.446 2.175 2.158 3.505 3.204 2.650 2.111
[3.87] [3.71] [1.25] [1.23] [1.30] [1.16] [0.97] [0.77]
R-squared 0.0001 0.0025 0.0006 0.0012 0.4272 0.4346 0.2943 0.3230
Note: The t-values are reported in the parentheses.
These pictures can be understood as the dynamic eﬀects of the oil price shock
have changed after the crisis and the interactions between oil prices and macro-
economic aggregates build diﬀerent patterns in the post-crisis sample period.
Turning to the impulse-response functions to the other structural shocks, we
report only the results in response to an AS shock to compare to pre-crisis re-
sults. The impulse-response functions to the rest of the structural shocks can be
interpreted similarly. Figure 5 presents the impulse-response functions to a local
AS shock in the third column. The shock increases real GDP, as expected from a
textbook AD-AS analysis. Although inﬂation decreases initially after the shock,
it increases by 0.2% in the long-run. The result is statistically insigniﬁcant, how-
ever, and we would not give much weight to it. Real interest rate increases due
to the initial deﬂationary pressure and increased productivity. Export increases,
given increased productivity after the shock.
3.3 Historical Simulation
To further examine the diﬀerent impacts an oil price hike may have on the Korean
economy before and after the crisis, we estimate dynamic correlations between
real GDP and CPI in response to historical oil price shocks before and after the
crisis. Thus, we ﬁrst extract historical disturbances from the estimated structural
VAR and eliminate all the shocks, other than oil price shocks, and then estimate
the dynamic correlations. If the correlations are positive (negative), this can be
interpreted as oil price shocks originating from the demand (supply) side of oil
market and having an aggregate demand (supply) nature in generating economic
ﬂuctuations.J−period ahead dynamic correlation at time t c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
Corr(∆ˆ Yt+j,∆ ˆ Pt+j|Ωt)=









σ(∆ˆ Yt+j|Ωt)σ(∆ ˆ Pt+j|Ωt)
=
η∆ˆ Yt+j η∆ ˆ Pt+j
σ(∆ˆ Yt+j|Ωt)σ(∆ ˆ Pt+j|Ωt)
where η∆ξt,t+j is the j−period ahead forecasting error of ξ (= ∆ˆ Yt, ∆ ˆ Pt)a n dΩt
is information set up to time t. The hatted variables denote the variables are
disturbed by oil price shocks only.
Figure 6 presents the dynamic correlations in the pre- and post-crisis periods.
In the short run, oil shocks work as demand factors; real GDP and CPI move
in the same direction for both periods. However, comparing the magnitudes of
the correlations, the post-crisis correlations are more than twice the pre-crisis
correlations in the short run.
The diﬀerence with respect to the nature of oil price shocks between the two
p e r i o d si sm o r ep r o n o u n c e dw h e nm e d i u mo r long run correlations are compared.
Medium or long run correlations are around 0.4 in the post-crisis period, indicating
that oil price shocks work as demand factors in the period. In contrast, medium
or long run correlations in the pre-crisis period are negative. The results imply
that oil price shocks worked as aggregate supply factors in the period.
These ﬁndings, combined with the earlier impulse-response analyses, lead to
the following conclusion. The identiﬁed oil price shocks from the VAR in the
pre-crisis period are mainly of aggregate supply nature and they aﬀect domestic
production adversely and raise CPI inﬂation by shifting the AS schedule to the
left. In contrast, the oil price shocks in the post-crisis period largely work as
aggregate factors and they increase export and domestic output, as well as CPI
inﬂation, as they shift the AD schedule to the right.
In summary, the oil price changes, especially upward changes, have brought
about many economic diﬃculties in the past. They may be still important macro-
economic factors but their impacts have been changed in recent years, as shown
in our VAR evidence. We argue that the nature of oil price shocks have changed
in recent years. In contrast to the previous oil price hikes, which were driven by
supply disruptions, the recent oil price hike originated from an increase in the de-
mand for oil. The demand-driven oil price hike has less, and diminished, adverse
eﬀects on the Korean economy compared to the previous oil price hikes.7
Thus far, we have examined the nature of oil price hikes and their macroeco-
nomic impacts on the Korean economy with VAR analyses. We next construct a
structural dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to further con-
7See Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009) for related results.sider economic and policy implications of the recent oil price hike. We especially
consider which monetary policy rule would work better amongst Taylor type rules
in the face of oil price inﬂation based on the DSGE model.
Figure 6: Dynamic Correlation Between Real GDP and CPI























4 Nominal Rigidities Model with Oil Consump-
tion
We construct a small open economy nominal rigidities model, with oil and non-oil
sectors, and extend the closed economy one sector models with oil usage, such as
in Bodenstein et al. (2008).
We start with the production side of the non-oil sector. We denote the non-oil
sector by subscript n and the oil sector by subscript o in the following equations.







,μ n ≥ 1 (15)
where yn,t is the ﬁnal good and yn,t (i) is the ith intermediate good in the non-oil





















where nn,t(i) is labor input, ot(i) is oil usage and zt is the labor augmenting
technology shock. This follows the law of motion given as
lnzt = z +l nzz,t−1 + ζz,t (19)
lnζz,t = ρζz lnζz,t−1 + εz,t,ε z,t ∼ N(0,σz) (20)
Intermediate goods producers behave as monopolistic competitors and set
prices using the Calvo mechanism. Namely, they set new prices with probability
1 − θn or adjust prices just as much as the trend inﬂation rate with probability















n,tyn,t+s (i) − MCn,t+s(i)yn,t+s (i)
¤
(21)
subject to the demand for the ith intermediate good Eq.(17). πn is the trend
inﬂation rate in the non-oil sector, PN
n,t is the newly set price, yn,t(i) is the ith
































The oil sector works similarly to the non-oil sector. Firms in the oil sector







,μ o ≥ 1 (25)
where yo,t is the ﬁnal good and yo,t (i) is the ith intermediate good in the oil sector.








where Po,t (i) is the ith intermediate oil good price. The demand for the ith








Production technology for the ith intermediate good is
yo,t (i)=zt(crt(i))
αcr (28)
where crt(i) is the crude oil input imported from abroad. We abstract the labor
input in the oil production for simplicity. Intermediate goods producers in the
oil sector also behave as monopolistic competitors and set prices using the Calvo


















where Pcr,t = StP∗
cr,t is the domestic crude oil price. This is the crude oil price in
dollar terms, P∗
cr,t, times nominal exchange rate, St.
We also assume imported goods (other than crude oil) prices are sticky. In-termediate importers behave as monopolistic competitors and set prices using the

























s (U (ct+s) − V (nt+s(i)))
#
(33)
subject to the budget constraint
Pn,tcn,t + Po,tco,t + Pm,tcm,t + Bt ≤ Wt(i)nt(i)+Πt + Tt +( 1+Rt−1)Bt−1 (34)
where ct is the ﬁnal consumption good, nt is the labor hours, Bt is the nominal
savings, Πt is the transfer from ﬁrms, Tt is the transfer from government, and Rt
is the nominal interest rate. The ﬁnal consumption good (ct)i sac o m p o s i t eo f
the domestically produced non-oil consumption good (cn,t), oil consumption good
















is a normalizing factor. The pa-
rameters wo and wm are the shares of the oil and imported consumption goods in
total consumption. Pn,t is the domestically produced non-oil consumption good’s
price, Po,t is the oil consumption good’s price and Pm,t is the imported good’s
price in the domestic currency. We drop subscript i, except for the household i’s
wage and labor supply assuming symmetric equilibrium.
First-order conditions, except for wage setting, are
Ucn,t = υtPn,t (36)
Uco,t = υtPo,t (37)






(39)where Ucn,t,U co,t and Ucm,t are the derivatives of the utility function with respect
to cn,t,c o,t and cm,t respectively. We assume the utility function takes a form as
U(ct)=ζc,t lnct,V (nt(i)) = ζn,tκnn(i)
2 (40)
where ζc,t and ζn,t are the consumption preference shock and labor supply shock










+ ρζn lnζn,t−1 + εn,t,ε n,t ∼ N(0,σn) (42)
In addition, κn is a normalizing factor that ensures the steady state labor supply
is 1/3 of available time.
Households set wages using the Calvo mechanism. Labor used for production







,μ w ≥ 1 (43)
















In each period, household i sets a new wage with probability 1−θw or adjusts
i t sw a g ej u s ta sm u c ha st h et r e n di n ﬂation rate times the trend growth rate with








s [−V (nt+s (i)) + υt+s (πc · z)
s W
N
t nt+s (i)] (46)
where πc is the ﬁnal consumption good’s trend inﬂation rate and z is the economy-













t ]=0 (47)Market clearing conditions are
yn,t = cn,t + Stx
∗
n,t (48)
yo,t = ot + co,t (49)
nt = nn,t (50)
where x∗
n,t is the non-oil goods export in dollar terms. We abstract the oil sector
export for simplicity. We deﬁne the real GDP of the economy as










Exogenous variables, detrended log non-oil goods export in dollar terms (e x∗
n,t),
detrended log real exchange rate(e ξt) and detrended log relative price of crude oil
to foreign price level (e γ
∗



























We assume e γ
∗
t does not contemporaneously aﬀect the other variables in Eq.(52).
We thus identify the eﬀects of oil price shocks (innovations in e γ
∗
t) using a recursive
ordering scheme, so that F0 is a lower triangle matrix.8
Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule given as
Rt = ρRRt−1 +( 1− ρR)(ρπcoreπcore,t−1 + ρπnonπnon,t−1 + ρye yt−1)+εm,t (53)
where e yt is the output gap and εm,t ∼ N(0,σ m). W ea l s on o t et h a tt h eﬁnal








We deﬁne core CPI inﬂation as CPI inﬂation excluding oil price inﬂation. Then,
we can deﬁne πcore,t =( wmπm,t +( 1− wo − wm)πn,t) and πnon,t = woπo,t.
We next estimate the nominal rigidities model constructed above using Bayesian
methods, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). The sample period for the estimation
8The oil price shocks in Eq.(52) are identiﬁed in the context of the DSGE model and monetary
policy assessments as in Bodenstein et al. (2008). They diﬀer from the oil price shocks identiﬁed
from the VAR analyses in the previous section to detect the diﬀerences in the nature of oil price
hikes. The oil price shocks in Eq.(52) would resemble oil price shocks originating from the purely
supply-side of oil markets.is 2000:I-2009:I, corresponding to the post Korean currency crisis period.9
We ﬁx some parameters by calibration and then estimate the remaining para-
meters by Bayesian methods. We set the subjective discount rate β as 0.981/4. The
non-oil sector production function parameters αn and αo are set as 0.448 and 0.062
respectively, using the shares of labor input and intermediate oil (petroleum) use
in the total value-added plus intermediate oil use in the non-oil (non-petroleum)
sector, obtained from the 2005 Korean input-output table. We also set αcr as
0.657, using the share of intermediate crude oil use in total value-added plus in-
termediate crude oil use in the oil (petroleum) sector from the input-output table.
We set the price and wage markup parameters, μn,μ o,μ m and μw as 1.1 as in
the literature. We calibrate the shares of oil (petroleum) and imported goods in
total consumption, wo and wm, as 0.021 and 0.390, respectively, using the shares
of oil (petroleum) and imported goods in the GDP from the input-output table.
We use the log diﬀerence of real GDP, CPI inﬂation rate, CPI energy price in-
ﬂation rate (as oil sector inﬂation rate), overnight call rate, linearly detrended log
export in dollar (constructed as export in real GDP divided by the real exchange
rate and then multiplied by core CPI and divided by CPI), linearly detrended
log real eﬀective exchange rate from BIS and linearly detrended log WTI price
divided by U.S. CPI (as the relative price of crude oil to foreign price level). We
obtain the data from the Korean National Statistical Oﬃce, Datastream and the
BIS. The seven observable variables match seven structural shocks in the model
and we can identify the model
In addition, we estimate the exogenous VAR block Eq.(52) with the data and
insert the estimated block in the model before the Bayesian estimations. We ﬁnd
a VAR with lag length one is appropriate based on the Schwartz criterion.
We estimate parameters concerning price, as well as wage stickiness, shock
processes and monetary policy rule, using Bayesian methods after log-linearizing
the model around the stationary steady states, as in Adolfson et. al. (2007) and
Smets and Wouters (2008).
We set the prior distributions of the price stickiness and wage stickiness para-
meters, θn,θ o,θ m and θw, as uniform distributions on the interval [0, 1]. We set the
prior distribution of the parameter concerning the weight on the non-oil inﬂation
rate, ρπcore, as a normal distribution with a mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation
of 0.4 and the prior distribution of the parameter concerning the weight on output
gap, ρy, as a beta distribution with a mean of 0.125 and a standard deviation of
0.1 following the literature. We set the prior distribution of the parameter con-
cerning the weight on the oil inﬂation rate, ρπnon, as a normal distribution with a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 2. The zero prior mean and relatively large
standard deviation reﬂect the lack of prior information concerning the monetary
9For the pre-crisis DSGE analysis, one may consult the working paper version of the paper,
Lee and Song (2009).policy response toward oil price inﬂation. We set the prior distributions of shock
persistence and monetary policy interest rate smoothing parameters, ρζz,ρ ζc,ρ ζn
and ρR, as beta distributions with a mean of 0.7 and a standard deviation of 0.1.
We set the prior distributions of all parameters concerning the shock standard
deviation as an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.2 and a standard
deviation of 2. We also estimate the diagonal elements of Σ∗ in the VAR block
Eq.(52), which is the identity matrix by deﬁnition, and set the prior distributions
o ft h ed i a g o n a le l e m e n t so ft h em a t r i xa si n v e r s eg a m m ad i s t r i b u t i o n sw i t ham e a n
of 1 and a standard deviation of 2. We will denote the ith diagonal element of
the matrix by Σ∗




Type Mean Std. Dev.
Non-oil price stickiness θn Uniform 0.5 1/
√
12
Imported goods price stickiness θm Uniform 0.5 1/
√
12
Oil price stickiness θo Uniform 0.5 1/
√
12
Wage stickiness θw Uniform 0.5 1/
√
12
Monetary policy non-oil inﬂation response ρπcore Normal 1.5 0.4
Monetary policy oil inﬂation response ρπnon Normal 0.0 2.0
Monetary policy output gap response ρy Beta 0.125 0.1
Interest rate smoothing ρR Beta 0.7 0.1
Aggregate tech. shock persistence ρζz Beta 0.7 0.1
Consumption preference shock persistence ρζc Beta 0.7 0.1
Labor supply shock persistence ρζn Beta 0.7 0.1
Monetary policy shock std. dev. σm Inv. Gamma 0.02 2
Aggregate tech. shock std. dev. σz Inv. Gamma 0.02 2
Consumption preference shock std. dev. σc Inv. Gamma 0.02 2
Labor supply shock std. dev. σn Inv. Gamma 0.02 2
VAR cov. matrix diagonal elements Σ∗
ii Inv. Gamma 1 2
Table 5 summarizes the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters.
When we examine the estimated posterior distributions of the price stickiness
parameters, the posterior of the non-oil sector price stickiness parameter, θn,i s
estimated to be highest; its mode is 0.958. The posterior of the oil sector price
stickiness parameter, θo, is estimated to be lowest amongst the price stickiness
parameters; its mode is 0.492. We note the estimated degree of oil price stickiness
diﬀers from zero, as we can see from the 10th percentile of the posterior. The
posterior mode of imported goods price stickiness, θm,i s0 . 8 4 3 ,b e t w e e nt h em o d e sof non-oil good’s price stickiness and oil good’s price stickiness. The posterior of
the wage stickiness parameter, θw, is estimated to be lower than the posteriors of
the price stickiness parameters; its mode is 0.210.10
Concerning the parameters of the monetary policy Taylor rule, the posterior
mode of the monetary policy response to non-oil price inﬂation parameter, ρπcore,
is 1.537, slightly higher than the prior mode. The posterior mode of the monetary
policy output gap response parameter, ρy, is 0.003, lower than the prior mode.
When we examine the posterior of the monetary policy response to oil price inﬂa-
tion, ρπnon, the mode is -0.120, the l0th percentile is -3.327 and the 90th percentile
is 3.188. Thus, the monetary policy response toward oil price inﬂation is rather
imprecisely estimated, including zero between the 10th and 90th percentile. The
estimated mode represents less anti or more accommodating policies toward oil




Mode Std. Dev. 10th Per. 90th Per.
Non-oil price stickiness θn 0.958 0.012 0.924 0.970
Imported goods price stickiness θm 0.843 0.066 0.744 0.938
Oil price stickiness θo 0.492 0.045 0.418 0.559
Wage stickiness θw 0.210 0.053 0.136 0.325
Mon. policy non-oil response ρπcore 1.537 0.313 1.268 2.320
Mon. policy oil response ρπnon -0.120 1.980 -3.327 3.188
Mon. policy output gap response ρy 0.003 0.006 3.031e-6 0.015
Interest rate smoothing ρR 0.698 0.091 0.563 0.833
Aggregate tech. shock per. ρζz 0.414 0.036 0.353 0.482
Cons. preference shock per. ρζc 0.835 0.046 0.710 0.883
Labor supply shock per. ρζn 0.974 0.011 0.946 0.985
Monetary policy shock std. dev. σm 0.026 0.003 0.024 0.032
Aggregate tech. std. dev. σz 0.352 0.065 0.268 0.475
Cons. preference shock std. dev. σc 0.161 0.031 0.131 0.254
Labor supply shock std. dev. σn 0.637 0.193 0.450 1.073
VAR cov. ﬁrst diag. element Σ∗
11 0.929 0.105 0.778 1.132
VAR cov. second diag. element Σ∗
22 0.925 0.104 0.775 1.133
VAR cov. third diag. element Σ∗
33 0.914 0.103 0.765 1.116
Marginal likelihood 375.9
10The estimated wage stickiness parameter is relatively low compared to previous results as
in Adolfson et. al. (2007). This might because we do not utilize wage data in the estimation
since we cannot obtain reliable Korean wage data.We can summarize our ﬁndings from the DSGE model based on the Korean
data as follows. First, the degree of oil sector price stickiness is relatively lower
than non-oil sector price stickiness, as in the literature. However, the oil sector
price is not completely ﬂexible diﬀering to the theoretical models, as in Aoki
(2001), in which optimal monetary policy is the complete stabilization of the core
inﬂation rate. Second, the monetary policy response toward non-core CPI inﬂation
is rather imprecisely estimated and the estimated posterior mode represents less
strict policy toward non-core CPI inﬂation than core CPI inﬂation.
5 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yR u l e s
In the following, we consider diﬀerent degrees of monetary policy responses toward
non-core oil price inﬂation in the Taylor type rules Eq.(53) and examine the eﬀects
on CPI inﬂation and output gap volatilities in the DSGE model. It would also
be necessary to consider diﬀerent values for ρπo, since its posterior distribution is
imprecisely estimated.
T a b l e6 :M o n e t a r yP o l i c yR u l e sa n dV o l a t i l i t i e s
Permanent Tech. Shocks
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0005 0.1491
Mode 0.0005 0.1489
Zero 0.0005 0.1489
90th. Per. 0.0005 0.1487
Preference Shocks
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0065 0.6923
Mode 0.0067 0.6949
Zero 0.0067 0.6950
90th. Per. 0.0068 0.6972
Labor Supply Shocks
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0413 0.5049
Mode 0.0380 0.4343
Zero 0.0378 0.4319
90th. Per. 0.0350 0.3727
Oil Shocks
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0021 0.1575
Mode 0.0021 0.1582
Zero 0.0021 0.1582
90th. Per. 0.0021 0.1593
Export Shocks
(1st shocks in VAR.)
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0041 0.1041
Mode 0.0043 0.1132
Zero 0.0043 0.1136
90th. Per. 0.0045 0.1231
Real Exchange Rate Shocks
(2nd shocks in VAR)
ρπnon S.D(πc) S.D(y)
10th. Per. 0.0022 0.1289
Mode 0.0022 0.1301
Zero 0.0022 0.1302
90th. Per. 0.0022 0.1323We further consider cases separately when the model economy is perturbed by
each structural shocks to examine the diﬀerent eﬀects of monetary policy responses
to the shocks. The other parameter values are set at their posterior modes.
We simulate the model by setting ρπnon equal to -3.327, -0.120, 0.0, and 3.188
respectively. They are respectively the 10th percentile, the mode, zero response
and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution of ρπnon. Table 6 reports the
results.
When the model economy is simulated with oil shocks only, more accommo-
dating policies toward oil price inﬂation works better, as we can reduce output
gap volatilities without raising CPI inﬂation volatilities very much. This resem-
bles the results from Dhawan and Jeske (2007). More aggressive monetary policies
toward oil price inﬂation destabilize non-oil sector inﬂation and output through
interest rate adjustments and lead to higher volatilities in overall CPI inﬂation
and output gap.
The results for the other structural shocks are mixed. In response to technology
shocks and labor supply shocks, more aggressive policy toward oil price inﬂation
works better. In response to consumption preference shocks, more accommodating
policy works better, as can be seen in Table 6.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The price of crude oil has increased steadily since 2002. It started to increase very
rapidly at the end of 2007. Facing the recent hike of the oil price, economists, as
well as policy-makers, became concerned with the diﬃculties the rising oil price
might have on the Korean economy.
This paper investigates the changing nature of oil price hikes and macroeco-
nomic responses to them in the Korean economy. We also evaluate which mone-
tary policy rule works better in the face of oil price shocks to stabilize the economy.
We ﬁnd that the recent run-up in oil price is induced by an increase in the demand
for oil and its eﬀects on the Korean economy are weak from the VAR analyses.
This is in contrast to the causes and eﬀects of the previous two oil price hikes in
1970s. In addition, we ﬁnd monetary policy in Korea needs to be operated more
or less accommodatingly to the oil price shocks to stabilize the economy given the
shocks and frictions in the DSGE model.
Naturally, there are other possible explanations for the declining importance of
oil price hikes. One may ascribe mild impacts of oil prices to the macroeconomy to
declining shares of oil in consumption and production. We look into the time series
f o rb o t hc o n s u m p t i o na n dp r o d u c t i o ns h a r e so fo i lb u tf a i lt oﬁnd conspicuous
changes in the shares. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in Kilian (2008).11 We
11However, Blanchard and Gali (2007) ﬁnd the decline in the share of oil in consumption andalso investigate whether the wage inﬂa t i o nh a ss h o w na n ys i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences
in the pre- and post-crisis periods but persuasive results cannot be found either.
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